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TORTS-JOINT AND CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS DEFINEDEFFECT OF RELEASE IN KENTUCKY
In the recent Kentucky case of Miller's Adm'x. v. Picard,' the
Court of Appeals, like many other courts, has created a trap for the
unwary in the use of the 'term joint tortfeasor and has seemingly
departed from certain established rules in this state. Briefly, the
facts were these: M employed S, the owner and operator of a taxicab, to transport her, and during the course of the journey, the
sheriff, who held a warrant for the arrest of S, sought to stop his cab.
S attempted to run the sheriff down. Then the latter fired into the
cab and killed M. M's administratrix filed suit against S, asking
damages in the sum of $10,000. A settlement for $350 was reached,
however, by which the administratrix gave a full and complete release to S. Then the sheriff was sued. The lower court dismissed the
petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and
held that where independent wrongful acts of two or more persons
concur in contributing to and producing a single injury, such persons
are joint tortfeasors and that a settlement with and a full release of
one joint tortfeasor bars any action against the other.
Were the defendants in the Miller case joint tortfeasors or were
they wrongdoers whose independent and concurrent acts combined
to produce a single result? The English rule is that such persons are
not joint tortfeasors3
Although joinder of concurrent wrongdoers
has been commonly allowed under the codes of procedure in the
United States,' the term joint tortfeasors should not be applied to
them, as Mr. Prosser says, through "careless usage."' And again he
writes: "No reason can be found for refusing to allow joinder without
making the parties 'joint' for any other purpose than the convenient
trial of the case."'
Among the sources on which the principal case relied to support the view that where independent wrongful acts of two or more
persons concur in contributing to and producing a single injury, such
persons must be regarded as joint tortfeasors, was a section from
American Jurisprudence.' There, however, both rules are stated;
and there is shown to be a clear conflict in the cases. The Kentucky
101 Ky. 157, 191 S. W. 2d 202 (1945).
"The Koursk, (1924) P. 140.
'KENTUCKY CIVIL CODE (Carroll, 1938) Sec. 83. For the application of this section, see Miller v. Weck, 186 Ky. 552, 217 S. W. 904
(1920); Pickerill v. City of Louisville, 125 Ky. 213, 100 S. W. 873
(1907).
'PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 1103.
'Id. at 1104.
'52 AMERICAN JURIsPRUDENCE (1944) 451-452. In accord with
the view that such persons are not joint tortfeasors, see Bonte v.
Postel, 109 Ky. 64, 58 S. W. 536 (1900). A very clear explanation is

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Court also cited Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Beaucond7 to support its holding that the sheriff and the taxi driver were joint tortfeasors. (Actually the defendants in the Beaucond case were independent and concurrent tortfeasors.) But in so doing it inadvertently overruled the earlier case on another point, namely, that a
release of one joint tortfeasor does not release the others. It would
seem to be the correct interpretation of the law that only joint liability is intended. It is not meant that the defendants should be
joint tortfeasors in the real sense of the term but only that they are
joined for the purpose of the suit.
The second problem is that of the release of one wrongdoer only
by the injured plaintiff. The cases in Kentucky prior to Miller's
Adm'x. v. Picard are in substantial accord to the effect that a release
of,' or a judgment against, one joint tortfeasor does not bar a suit
against remaining tortfeasors unless full satisfaction has been received in the first instance. Many of those decisions contain the same
statement as in the Miller case which results in treating concurrent
but independent wrongdoers as joint tortfeasors. If the Kentucky
courts have allowed one tbrtfeasor acting in concert with another to
be released without prejudice to later settlements with the others,
it should be true, a fortiori, that one who is a concurrent tortfeasor
may be released without barring a later recovery against the other,
or others.
Whether the tort is joint or concurrent, the test to be used
should be not, was there a release of one,0 but has full satisfaction
given in the case of Dickson v. Yates, 194 Iowa 910, 188 N. W. 948,
951 (1922), where it is said:
"The joint liability of wrongdoers in tort is a joint and several liability, but exists only where the wrong itself is joint. A
mere similarity of design or conduct on the part of the independent actors is not sufficient to constitute such actors joint tortfeasors. . . . If the tort of two or more parties is several when
committed, it does not become joint by reason of the union of
the consequences of the several torts in producing any injury."
'188 Ky. 725, 224 S. W. 179 (1920).
'Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Brian's Adm'r., 224 Ky. 419, 6
S. W. 2d 491 (1928); Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Beaucond, 188
Ky. 725, 224 S. W. 179 (1920); City of Louisville v. Nicholls, 158 Ky.
516, 165 S. W. 660 (1914); City of Covington v. Westbay, 156 Ky.
839, 162 S. W. 91 (1914); Louisville & Evansville Mail Co. v. Barnes'
Adm'r., 117 Ky. 860, 79 S. W. 261 (1904).
'Brown's Adm'r. v. Little, 160 Ky. 765, 170 S. W. 168 (1914);
United Society of Shakers v. Underwood, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 265
(1875); Sharp v. Gray, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 4 (1844); Elliot v. Porter,
35 Ky. (5 Dana) 299 (1837).
"A release may be made upon a consideration, which may be
very small. It may also reserve the right to seek compensation from
the remaining party, as in Louisville Times Co. v. Lancaster, 142 Ky.
122, 133 S. W. 1155 (1911). Somewhat like a release is a covenant
not to sue, which has been held not to release other wrongdoers in
the cases of Matheson v. Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 97 N. W. 638 (1912);
and Joyce v. Massachusetts Real Estate Co., 173 Minn. 310, 217 N. W.
337 (1928).
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been received for the entire injury?' The Court held, however, that
a release of one concurrent tortfeasor for $350 released all by barring
the subsequent suit against the sheriff. Prior Kentucky cases have
adopted the better view by saying that unless full satisfaction is intended by the party giving the release, he may later sue those not
released. For example, in the case of City of Covington v. Westbay,"
the plaintiff received $750 from the street railway company and later
got a judgment of $500 against the city. The Court, in holding that
the release of the railway company did not bar the recovery against
the city, said:
"Whatever may be the rule in other States, it is well settled
in this jurisdiction, in view of the foregoing statute, that the
acceptance by the injured party of a certain sum from one of two
joint [really concurrent] tortfeasors in part satisfaction of his
cause of action does not release the other."32
Again the Kentucky Court of Appeals said, in Louisville &
Evansville Mail Co. v. Barnes' Adm'r.," (quoting an opinion of the
United States Supreme Court), that satisfaction should be "in full
for the injury done to him, from whatever source it may have come."
The facts in the Miller case lead us to conclude that the release for
$350 certainly was not intended by the releasor nor by the releasee
as full satisfaction for the entire injury.
There is no problem of double recovery or unjust enrichment in
cases in which the parties intend only a partial satisfaction, for in
later actions the earlier recovery is credited pro tanto against the
amount of the judgment or settlement." Thus that objection is removed, and the plaintiff is allowed to receive what he is justly entitled to get, that is, full compensation for his entire injury, Only in
those cases where the first settlement represents full or substanial
satisfaction should later actions be barred. For instance, in the case
7
of Thomas' Adm'r. v. Maysville Street Railway & Transfer Co.,' the
plaintiff recovered two judgments, one for $5,500, and one for
$5,000. He was required to elect which judgment would be satisfied.
"Exactly the same problem arose in Moreland's Adm'r. v. Stone,
292 Ky. 521, 166 S. W. 2d 998 (1942), the full account of which appears in a note, Evans, Proximate Cause, Settlement, Last Clear
Chance, Standard of Care in Emergencies (1943) 31 Ky. L. J. 346.
See also Note, Torts-Joint Wrongdoers-Release of One as Bar to an
Action Against Another (1921) 34 HARV. L. REV. 442.
"156 Ky. 839, 162 S. W. 91 (1914).
Id. at 842, 162 S. W. at 93. The statute referred to is now Ky.
R. S. 454.040, discussed later in this note.
1 117 Ky. 860, 874-875, 79 S. W. 261, 264 (1904).
"Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 1, 17, 18 L. Ed. 129, 134
(1865).
"Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Brian's Adm'r., 224 Ky. 419, 6
S. W. 2d 491 (1928); City of Louisville v. Nicholls, 158 Ky. 516, 165
S. W. 660 (1914).
" 136 Ky. 446, 124 S. W. 398 (1910). Also see Button v. City of
Louisville, 118 S. W. 977 (Ky. 1909).
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It is clear in that situation, as distinguished from the case at hand,
that a subsequent action should not be brought against, or another
judgment collected from, the remaining wrongdoers.
(In the
Thomas case, as in the Miller case, the tortfeasors were concurrent.)
The arguments advanced here concerning the distinctions between joint and concurrent tortfeasors and between a release, on the
one hand, and satisfaction, on the other, receive additional support
from the Kentucky statutes and the cases which have interpreted
them. Section 454.040 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provides:
"In actions of trespass the jury may assess joint or several damages
against the defendants." Sellards v. Zomes interpreted this section in
terms of release by saying:
"The liability of joint trespassers is several, and any one
or all of them may be sued for the entire wrong; consequently,
since our statute of 1836, authorizing several judgments, a dismission or release of
one or more who are sued, can not, per se,
release the others."' 8 (The defendants were actually joint tortfeasors and acted in concert.)
Section 412.030 of Kentucky Revised Statutes, passed in 1926,
provides: "Contribution among wrongdoers may be enforced where
the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no moral turpitude." It is held that this section changes the common law rule that
no right of contribution could be enforced among joint wrongdoers
in pari delicto." Where, as in Kentucky, several liability and the
right of contribution among joint and concurrent wrongdoers exist,
it may be stated all the more strongly that the release of either a
joint or a concurrent tortfeasor does not release others in the same
class.
It is submitted that as the proper basis for its decisions the
Court should, in the first place, distinguish between joint and concurrent tortfeasors; but also, secondly, should allow later suits
against the remaining joint or concurrent wrongdoers unless an
approximately full satisfaction from one or more of them has been
received by the plaintiff. The application of sound legal principles
forces the writer to reach this result. The Miller case creates a trap
for the unwary. In the older law, the act, uninterpreted by the will
behind it, was assigned its solemn consequences. When the intention of the actor came to be given prominence (about the time when
no liability without fault, save in special circumstances, began to be
followed by the courts), the inevitable consequences of accident
were not thrown upon the actor. This doctrine that a release of one
' 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 90, 91 (1868).
Also see Lyons v. Southeastern
Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106, 137 S. W. 2d 1107 (1940).
" Louisville Railway Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
256 Ky. 827, 77 S. W. 2d 36 (1934); Consolidated Coach Corp. v.
Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S. W. 2d 16 (1932).
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is a release of all tortfeasors, whether joint or concurrent, should
follow the present trend in the case of releases of a joint promisor in
the law of contracts.'
E. DURWARD WELDON

"The obligation of joint or of concurrent tortfeasors is somewhat
analogous to the obliration of co-obligors in the law of contracts. First
of all, a distinction should be made between joint obligors and several obligors, just as joint and concurrent tortfeasors should be distinguished. THE RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 123, states
that although a release of one joint obligor discharges the other
promisors from their joint duty, it does not release them from their
several duties. This is true in Kentucky, where joint and several
duties exist.
As in the case of joint and concurrent tortfeasors, the test to be
applied is not a release itself, but is full satisfaction. On this point
Mr. Williston writes: "To the modern mind a release of one debtor
is not necessarily a release or satisfaction of the debt itself." 2
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1936)
See. 334, p. 973. If the releasor and the releasee intend only a
partial satisfaction or if a valid and full consideration is not paid,
then the other obligors or obligees, as the situation may be, are not
released after the obligation has become past due. Lewis v. Browning, 223 Ky. 771, 4 S. V. 2d 734 (1928). A desirable rule for Kentucky
to follow may be found stated in section 3 of the Uniform Joint Obligations Act, adopted in four states, which follows: "The value of
any consideration received by the obligee from any co-obligor is to
be credited on the obligations of all his co-obligors except those for
whom he is surety for that debt." See the summary of this section
in 2 WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

(Rev. Ed.

1936) Sec. 336 A, p. 985. The Act is in force (as of 1936) in Nevada,
New York, Utah, and Wisconsin.

